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1. INTRODUCTION 
Computer systems are often embedded in complex environments with which they 
interact. In programming such applications, the designer normally has an elaborate 
mental model of the environment and how the system’s action will change the 
environment’s state. Users of the system also have this kind of mental model. 
Typically, however, the system itself does not maintain an explicit model of the 
world it is operating in. This can make life difficult both for programmers and users 
-they may end up having to reconstruct the model being used, as there is no way 
for the system to explain or justify its behavior. But more importantly, this makes it 
difficult to reconfigure or extend the system by giving it “high-level” instructions, 
since it has no understanding at all of what it is doing.’ 
In this paper, we propose a programming language for such systems, whose 
design is based on a sophisticated logic of action. The interpreter for the language 
automatically maintains an explicit model of the system’s environment and capabil- 
ities, which can be queried and reasoned with at run time. This allows complex 
behaviors to be defined at a much higher level of abstraction than would be 
possible otherwise. The language appears to be a distinct improvement over 
current technology for application such as: high-level control of robots and me- 
chanical devices, programming intelligent software agents, modeling and simulation 
of discrete event systems, etc. 
In the next section, we outline the theory of action on which our language is 
based. Then, we show how complex actions can be defined in the framework and 
explain how the resulting set of complex action expressions can be viewed as a 
programming language. In Section 4, we illustrate how our language is used 
through an example: a simple elevator controller. In the following section, we 
describe an implementation of the language, and sketch what experimental applica- 
tions have been developed. Section 6 discusses the main distinguishing characteris- 
tics of the language. We conclude by summarizing the main features of our 
proposal, discussing its limitations, and outlining ongoing work that seeks to 
address these. The presentation throughout is informal in nature; in a companion 
paper [14], we explore the more formal aspects of this work. 
2. INFORMAL INTRODUCTION TO THE SITUATION CALCULUS 
To obtain the benefits mentioned in the Introduction, it is necessary to explicitly 
model how the world changes as a result of performing actions. There are a variety 
of ways of doing this, and we use the language of the situation calculus. 
2.1. Intuitive Ontology for the Situation Calculus 
The situation calculus (McCarthy [201) is a first order language (with, as we shall 
see later, some second order features) specifically designed for representing dy- 
namically changing worlds. All changes to the world are the result of named 
actions. A possible world history, which is simply a sequence of actions, is repre- 
sented by a first order term called a situation. The constant S, is used to denote 
’ A similar view is advanced in Dixon [3]. 
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the initial situation, namely that situation in which no actions have yet occurred. 
There is a distinguished binary function symbol do; do(cu, s) denotes the successor 
situation to s resulting from performing the action (Y. Actions may be parameter- 
ized. For example, p&x, y) might stand for the action of putting object x on 
object y, in which case do(put(A, B),s) denotes that situation resulting from 
placing A on B when the world is in situation s. Notice that in the situation 
calculus, actions are denoted by first order terms, and situations (world histories) 
are also first order terms. For example, do(putdown(A), do(wulk(l), do(pick- 
up(A), SO))) is a situation denoting the world history consisting of the sequence of 
actions [pickup(A), walk(L), putdown(A)]. Notice that the sequence of actions in a 
history, in the order in which they occur, is obtained from a situation term by 
reading off its actions from right to left. 
Relations whose truth values vary from situation to situation, called relational 
fluents, are denoted by predicate symbols taking a situation term as their last 
argument. For example, is_canying(robot, p, s), meaning that a robot is carrying 
package p in situation s, is a relational fluent. Functions whose denotations vary 
from situation to situation are called functional fluents. They are denoted by 
function symbols with an extra argument aking a situation term, as in loc(robot, s), 
i.e., the robot’s location in situation s. 
2.2. Axiomatizing Actions and Their Effects in the Situation Calculus 
Actions have preconditions-necessary and sufficient conditions that characterize 
when the action is physically possible. For example, in a blocks world, we might 
have: ’
Pos.s( pickup(x) , s) 
= [(Vz)~holding(z,s)] Anexto(x,s) A ~heuqy(x). 
World dynamics are specified by effect axioms. These describe the effects of a 
given action on the fluents-the causal laws of the domain. For example, a robot 
dropping a fragile object causes it to be broken: 
f’oss(drop(r,x),s) r\fragile(x,s) Ibroken(x,do(drop(r,x),s)). (2.1) 
Exploding a bomb next to an object causes it to be broken: 
Poss(e.xpfode(b),s) Anexto(b,x,s) Ibroken(x,do(explode(b),s)). (2.2) 
A robot repairing an object causes it to be not broken: 
Poss(repair(r,x),s) 2 Tbroken(n,do(repair(r,x),s)). (2.3) 
2.3. The Frame Problem 
As first observed by McCarthy and Hayes [201, axiomatizing a dynamic world 
requires more than just action preconditions and effect axioms. So-called frame 
axioms are also necessary. These specify the action invariants of the domain, 
* In formulas, free variables are considered to be universally quantified from the outside. This 
convention will be followed throughout the paper. 
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namely, those fluents which remain unaffected by a given action. For example, a 
robot dropping things does not affect an object’s color: 
Poss(drop(r,x),s) /Ycolor(y,s) =c~ccolor(y,do(drop(r,x),s)) =c. 
A frame axiom describing how the fluent broken remains unaffected: 
Poss(drop(r,x),s) A Tbroken(y,s) A [y+xV Tfragile(y,s)] 
I ~broken(y,do(drop(r,x),s)). 
The problem introduced by the need for such frame axioms is that we can 
expect a vast number of them. Only relatively few actions will affect the truth value 
of a given fluent; all other actions leave the fluent unchanged. For example, an 
object’s color is not changed by picking things up, opening a door, going for a walk, 
electing a new prime minister of Canada, etc. This is problematic for the axioma- 
tizer who must think of all these axioms; it is also problematic for the theorem 
proving system, as it must reason efficiently in the presence of so many frame 
axioms. 
2.3.1. What Counts as a Solution to the Frame Problem? Suppose the person 
responsible for axiomatizing an application domain has specified all of the causal 
laws for the world being axiomatized. More precisely, she has succeeded in writing 
down all the effect axioms, i.e., for each fluent F and each action A which can 
cause F’s truth value to change, axioms of the form 
Poss(A,s) ~R(x’,s) ~(~)F(x’,do(A,s)). 
Here, R is a first order formula specifying the contextual conditions under which 
the action A will have its specified effect on F. 
A solution to the frame problem is a systematic procedure for generating, from 
these effect axioms, all the frame axioms. If possible, we also want a parsimonious 
representation for these frame axioms (because in their simplest form, there are 
too many of them). 
2.4. A Simple Solution to the Frame Problem 
By appealing to earlier ideas of Haas [7], Schubert [29] and Pednault 1211, Reiter 
[23] proposes a simple solution to the frame problem, which we illustrate with an 
example. Suppose that (2.0, (2.21, and (2.3) are all the effect axioms for the fluent 
broken, i.e., they describe all the ways that an action can change the truth value of 
broken. We can rewrite (2.1) and (2.2) in the logically equivalent form: 
Poss(a,s) A [(gr){u =drop(r,x) Afiagile(x,s)) 
V(Zlb)(a=explode(b) Anexto(b,x,s)}] (2.4) 
xbroken(x,do(a,s)). 
Similarly, consider the negative effect axiom (2.3) for broken; this can be rewritten 
as: 
Po.s.s(a,s) A (3r)a =repair(r,x) 2 7 broken(x,do(a,s)). (Z-5) 
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In general, we can assume that the effect axioms for a fluent F have been 
written in the forms: 
Poss(a,s) A $(.?,u,s) 3,F(x’,do(a,s)), (2.6) 
Poss(u,s) A y,(Z,u,s) 3 7F(x’,do(u,s)). (2-T) 
Here yg(x’, a, s) is a formula describing under what conditions doing the action a 
in situation s leads the fluent F to become true in the successor situation Mu, $1; 
similarly y;(x’, a, s) describes the conditions under which performing a in s results 
in F becoming false in the successor situation. The solution to the frame problem 
of [23] rests on a completeness assumption, which is that the causal axioms (2.6) and 
(2.7) characterize all the conditions under which action a can lead to a fluent F(Z) 
becoming true (respectively, false) in the successor situation. In other words, 
axioms (2.6) and (2.7) describe all the causal laws affecting the truth values of the 
fluent F. Therefore, if action a is possible and F(x’)‘s truth value changes from 
false to true as a result of doing a, then y,Z(x’, a, s) must be true and similarly for a 
change from true to false. Reiter [23] shows how to derive a successor state axiom 
of the following form from the causal axioms (2.6) and (2.7) and the completeness 
assumption. 
Successor State Axiom 
Poss(u,s) 2 [F(x’,do(u,s)) = y,‘(_?,u,s) v (F(Z,s) A y;(Z’,a,s))]. 
This simple axiom embodies a solution to the frame problem. Notice that this 
axiom universally quantifies over actions a. In fact, this is one way in which a 
parsimonious solution to the frame problem is obtained. 
Applying this to our example about breaking things, we obtain the following 
successor state axiom: 
Poss(u,s) 2 [broken(x,do(u,s)) 
= (3r){u =drop(r,x) Afragile(x,s)} 
V(3b){u =explode(b) Ane.xto(b,x,s)} 
Vbroken(x,s) A 7(3r)u=repuir(r,x)]. 
It is important to note that the above solution to the frame problem presup- 
poses that there are no state constraints, as for example in the blocks world 
constraint: (Vs).on(x, y, s> 3 1 on(y, X, s). Such constraints sometimes implicitly 
contain effect axioms (so-called indirect effects), in which case the above complete- 
ness assumption will not be true. The assumption that there are no state con- 
straints in the axiomatization of the domain will be made throughout this paper. In 
[17, 151, the approach discussed in this section is extended to deal with state 
constraints, by compiling their effects into the successor state axioms. 
2.5. Axiomatizing an Application Domain in the Situation Calculus 
In general, a particular domain of application will be specified by the union of the 
following sets of axioms: 
l Action precondition axioms, one or each primitive action. 
l Successor state axioms, one for each fluent. 
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l Unique names axioms for the primitive actions. 
l Axioms describing the initial solution-what is true initially, before any 
actions have occurred. This is any finite set of sentences which mention no 
situation term, or only the situation term S,. 
l Foundational, domain independent axioms for the situation calculus. These 
include unique names axioms for situations, and an induction axiom. Since 
these play no special role in this paper, we omit them. For details, and for 
their metamathematical properties, see Lin and Reiter [17] and Reiter [24]. 
3. COMPLEX ACTIONS, PROCEDURES, AND GOLOG 
The previous section outlines a situation calculus-based approach for representing, 
and reasoning about, simple actions. It fails to address the problem of expressing, 
and reasoning with, complex actions and procedures, for example: 
l if car_in_dtiveway then dtiue else walk endIf 
l while (3 block) ontable( block) do rernove_a -block endWhile 
l proc remove_a -block (n_x)[ pickup(x); putaway( endProc 
Here, we have introduced a procedure declaration (remove-a -block), and also the 
nondeterministic operator n; (~Tx)[~(x)] means nondeterministically pick an indi- 
vidual x, and for that X, perform 6(n). We shall see later that this kind of 
nondeterminism is very useful for robotics and similar applications. 
3.1. Complex Actions and Procedures in the Situation Calculus 
Our approach will be to define complex action expressions using some additional 
extralogical symbols (e.g., while, if, etc.) which act as abbreviations for logical 
expressions in the language of the situation calculus. These extralogical expressions 
should be thought of as macros which expand into genuine formulas of the 
situation calculus. So below, we define the abbreviation Do(6, s, s’), where 6 is a 
complex action expression; intuitively, Do( 6, s, s’) will hold whenever the situation 
s’ is a terminating situation of an execution of complex action S starting in 
situation s. Note that our complex actions may be nondeterministic, that is, may 
have several different executions terminating in different situations. 
Do is defined intuitively on the structure of its first argument as follows: 
1. Primitive actions: 
Do(a,s,s’)defPoss(a[s],s) /Ls’=do(a[s],s). 
By the notation a[s] we mean the result of restoring the situation arguments 
to any functional fluents mentioned by the action term a (see the next item 
immediately below). For example, if a is read(favorite_book(John)), and if 
favorite_book is a functional fluent (which means that its value is situation 
dependent) then a[sl is read( favorite_book(John, s)). 
2. Test actions: 
Do($I?,s,s’)def(b[s] As=s’. 
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Here, $J is a pseudo-fluent expression (not a situation calculus formula) 
which stands for a formula in the language of the situation calculus, but with 
all situation arguments suppressed. ~[sI denotes the situation calculus for- 
mula obtained from 4 by restoring situation variable s as the suppressed 
situation argument for all fluent names (relational and functional) mentioned 
in 4. 
Examples: If $ is 
(Vx).ontuble(x) A ~on(x,A), 
then 4[s] stands for 
(Vx).ontable(x,s) A 70n(x,A,s). 
If 4 is 
(3x)on(x,fauon’te_block(Mury)), 
then +[sl stands for 
(3x)on(x,fauon’te_block(Muly,s),s). 
3. Sequence: 
Do([6,;6,],s,s’)~((3s*).(Do(s~,s,s*) ADo(8*,S*,S’)). 
4. Nondeterministic choice of two actions: 
Do((6,~6,),s,s’)d9fDo(8~,s,sI) vDo(~2,s,s’). 
5. Nondeterministic choice of action arguments: 
Do((Trx) C?(x),s,s’) Qx) Do( S(x),s,s’). 
6. Nondeterministic teration: Execute 6 zero or more times. 
Do( 6*) s, s’) 
~f(vlJ).{(vs,)P(sl.sl) A 
(VW2~~3)~fY SI,%) ADo(a,s,,s,) =‘(s,J,)]} 
3P(s,s’). 
In other words, doing action 6 zero or more times takes you from s to s’ iff 
(s, s’) is in every set (and therefore, the smallest set) such that: 
(a) (s,, sr) is in the set for all situations sl. 
(b) Whenever (sr, s,> is in the set, and doing 6 in situation s2 takes you to 
situation s3, then (sr, s3) is in the set. 
The above definition of nondeterministic iteration utilizes the standard 
second order way of expressing this set. Some appeal to second order logic 
appears necessary here because transitive closure is not first order definable, 
and nondeterministic iteration appeals to this closure. 
Conditionals and white-loops can be defined in terms of the above constructs as 
follows: 
if cj then 6, else 6, endIf2[+?; $]I[ T$?; s,], 
while 4 do 6 endWhile z [ [ +?; 6 ]* ; 7 +?I . 
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Procedures: 
The difficulty with giving a situation calculus semantics for recursive procedure 
calls using macro expansion is that there is no straightforward way to macro 
expand a procedure body when that body includes a recursive call to itself. 
1. We begin with an auxiliary macro definition: For any predicate symbol P of 
arity 12 + 2, taking a pair of situation arguments: 
Do(P(t,,..., t,),s,s’)delp(tJs] )... ,fn[sl,s,s’). 
In what follows, expressions of the form P(t , , . . . , r,> occurring in programs 
will serve as procedure calls, and we will understand Do(P(t,, . . . , t,>, s, s’) to 
mean that executing the procedure P on actual parameters t,, . . . , t, causes a 
transition from situation s to s’. Notice that in the macro expansion, the 
actual parameters (ti) are first evaluated with respect to the current situation 
s (tJs1) before passing them to the procedure P, so the procedure mechanism 
we are defining is call by value. Because we now want to include procedure 
calls among our actions, we extend the definition of complex actions to 
consist of any expression that can be constructed from primitive actions and 
procedure calls using the complex action constructors of l-6 above. 
2. Next, we define a situation calculus semantics for programs involving (recur- 
sive) procedures. We suppose, in the standard block-structured programming 
style, that a GOLOG program consists of a sequence of declarations of 
procedures P,, . . . , P,,, with formal parameters Cr;, . . . , 5, and procedure bod- 
ies a,,..., S, respectively, followed by a main program body S,. Here, 
6 1,.“, S,, 8, are complex actions, extended by actions for procedure calls, as 
described in 1 above. So a GOLOG program will have the form: 
proc P1( iTI) 6, endProc; . . . ; proc P,( G’,,) S,, endhoc; 8,. 
We define the result of evaluating a program of this form as follows: 
Do({proc P,(C’,)6, endproc;...; proc Pn(.Gn)S,, endProc; &,},s,s’) 
~(VPI,...,P,). ;i (vs,,s,,~).Do(6i,s,,s,) 3Do(Pi(~)Ys,,s~) 
i=l 1 3Do(6,,s,s’). 
This is the situation calculus definition corresponding to the more usual 
Scott-Strachey least fixed-point definition in standard programming language 
semantics @toy [321X3 
Examples: 
1. Given that down means move an elevator down one floor, define d(n), 
meaning move an elevator down II floors. 
proc d( n)( n = O)? Jd( rz - 1); down endProc. 
3 By using programs as above within the bodies of other procedures, we obtain the tree-structured 
nesting of procedures typical of Algol-like languages. Moreover, we get the lexical scoping rules of these 
languages for free from our use of the quantifiers in the definition of DO. 
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2. Parking an elevator on the ground floor: 
proc park ( TT m) [ atj7oor( m)?; d(m)] endProc. 
3. Define above to be the test action which is the transitive closure of on. 
proc aboue(x,y)(x=y)?J(rz)[on(x,z)?; aboue(z,y)] endProc. 
4. clean means put away all the blocks into the box. 
proc clean (Vx)[block(x) ~in(x,Box)]?I 
(T x) [(Vy) 7 on( y, x)?; put( x, lox)] ; clean endProc. 
5. A GOLOG blocks world program consisting of three procedure declarations 
devoted to creating towers of blocks, and a main program which makes a 
seven block tower, while ensuring that block A is clear in the final situation. 
proc maketower % Make a tower of n blocks. 
(TX, m>[tower(x, m) ?; % tower(x, m> means that there is a tower 
% of m blocks, whose top block is x. 
if m in then stack(x,n -m> 
else unstack(x, m - n) 
endIf] 
endProc; 
proc stack(x, n) % Place n blocks on the tower whose top block is x. 
n = O? 1 CT y>[put(y, x>; stack(y, n - 111 
endProc; 
proc unstack(x, n) % Remove n blocks from the tower 
% whose top block is x. 
n = O? ) (m y)[on(x, y)?; mouetotabfe(x); unstackcy, n - 111 
endProc; 
% main: create a seven block tower, with A clear at the end. 
maketower( -, Elx)on(x, A)? 
Except for procedures, this formalization draws considerably from dynamic logic 
151. In effect, it reifies as situations in the object language of the situation calculus, 
the possible worlds with which the semantics of dynamics logic is defined. For a 
more technical treatment of this macro approach to complex actions, see Levesque, 
Lin, and Reiter [14]. 
3.2. why Macros? 
Programs and complex actions “macro expand” to (sometimes second order) 
formulas of the situation calculus; complex behaviors are described by situation 
calculus formulas. But why do we treat these as macros rather than as first class 
objects (terms) in the language of the situation calculus? To see why, consider the 
complex action 
while [( 3block)ontabZe( block)] do remove-a-block endWhile. 
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Now ask what kind of thing is ontuble(block)? It is not a fluent, since fluents take 
situations as arguments. But it is meant to stand for a fluent since the expression 
ontuble(block) will be evaluated with respect to the current situation of the 
execution of the while-loop. To see what must happen if we avoid the macro 
approach, suppose we treat complex actions as genuine first order terms in the 
language of the situation calculus. 
l We must augment his language with new distinguished function symbols ?, ;, 
1, n, and perhaps while, if-then-else. 
l Moreover, since a while-loop is now a first order term, the p in whife(p, a> 
must be a first order term also. But p can be any “formula” standing for a 
situation calculus formula, e.g., ontuble(block), (3x, y).ontuble(x) A 7 red(n) 
v on(x, y>. 
A- 
l So we must introduce new function_symbols into the language; on, ontable, 
and, or, exists, not etc. (We need on to distinguish it from the fluent on.> 
Now these “formulas” look like genuine terms: 
ontable( block), 
Notice that X and Y here must be constants. In other words, we must reify, 
fluents and formulas about fluents whose situation arguments have been 
suppressed. This makes the resulting first order language much more compli- 
cated. 
l Even worse, we must axiomatize the correspondence between these reified 
formulas and the actual situation calculus formulas they stand for. In the 
axioms for Do, such reified formulas get evaluated as 
Do(p?,s,s’) =upply(p,s) As=s’. 
Here, upply(p, s) is true iff the reified formula p, with its situation argument 
s restored (so that it becomes a genuine situation calculus formula), is true. 
So we have to axiomatize apply. These axioms are schemas over fluents F 
and reified formulas p,pI, pz and the quantified “variables” X of these 
expressions. 
UPPly( i.(f p...,+) ~F(aPPlyl(t,,s),...,uPPlyl(t,,s),s), 
where apply1 restores situation arguments to functional fluents. Also needed 
are: 
etc. 
All of this would result in a much more complex theory. To avoid this technical 
clutter, we have chosen to take the above macro route in defining complex actions, 
and to see just how far we can push this idea. As we shall see, it is possible to 
develop a very rich theory of actions this way. 
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3.3. Programs as Macros: What Price Do We Pay? 
By opting to define programs as macros, we obtain a much simpler theory than if 
we were to reify these actions. The price we pay for this is a less expressive 
formalism. For example, we cannot quantify over complex actions, since these are 
not objects in the language of the situation calculus. This means, for example, that 
we cannot synthesize programs using conventional theorem proving techniques, as 
in Manna and Waldinger [19]. In their approach to program synthesis, one would 
obtain a program satisfying the goal formula Goal as a side effect of proving the 
following entailment: 
AxiomsK (36,s).Do(6,S,,s) A Goal(s). 
Here, Axioms are those described in Section 2.5. But the program to be synthe- 
sized is being existentially quantified in the theorem, so that this theorem cannot 
even be expressed in our language. 
On the other hand, many other program properties are, in principle, provable 
with our formalism. Moreover, doing so is (conceptually) straightforward precisely 
because program executions are formulas of the situation calculus. 
1. Correctness: To show that, whenever program 6 terminates, it leads to a 
world situation satisfying property P: 
Rvioms~((Vs).Do(S,S,,s) 3P(s). 
Or, the stronger 
Axioms~((tls,,s).Do(G,s,,s) 3P(s). 
2. Termination: To show that program 6 terminates: 
A.Xiomst= (3s)Do(6,S,,s). 
Or, the stronger 
Axioms b (Vs,)(3s)Do( 8,s0,s). 
In other words, our macro account is well-suited to applications where a program 6 
is @en, and the job is to prove it has some property. As we will see, the main 
property we have been concerned with is execution: given 6 and an initial 
situation, find a terminating situation for 6, if one exists. To do so, we prove the 
termination of 6 as above, and then extract from the proof a binding for the 
terminating situation, 
3.4. GOLOG 
The program and complex action expressions defined above can be viewed as a 
programming language whose semantics is defined via macro-expansion into sen- 
tences of the situation calculus. We call this language GOLOG, for “alGO in 
LOGic.” GOLOG appears to offer significant advantages over current tools for 
applications in dynamic domains like the high-level programming of robots and 
software agents, process control, discrete event simulation, etc. In the next section, 
we present a simple example. 
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4. AN ELEVATOR CONTROLLER IN GOLOG 
Here we show how to axiomatize the primitive actions and fluents for a simple 
elevator, and we write a GOLOG program to control this elevator. 
Primitive actions: 
. up(n)-Move the elevator up to floor n. 
l down(n)--Move the elevator down to floor n. 
l tumofl(n)--Turn off call button n. 
. open-Open the elevator door. 
. close-Close the elevator door. 
Fluents: 
. current_fioor(s) = n-In situation S, the elevator is at floor n. 
. on(n, s)-In situation s, call button n is on. 
. next_jIoor(n, s)-In situation S, the next floor to be served is n. 
Primitive action preconditions: 
Poss(up(n),s) = current_jloor( s) < n. 
Poss(down(n),s) =current_floor(s) >n. 
Poss( open, s) = true. 
Poss( close, s) = true. 
Poss(tumofS(n),s) =on(n,s). 
Successor state axioms: 
Poss(a,s) I [current_floor(do(a,s)) =m 
= {a =up(m) Vu =down(m) 
V 
current_loor( s) 
=m A T(3n)a =up(n) A T(3n)a =down(n)}]. 
Poss(a,s) ~[on(m,do(a,s)) =on(m,s) r\a#turnoff(m)]. 
A defined fluent. 
next-floor(n,s) =on(n,s) 
A(Vm).on(m,s) 3Irn -current_~7oor(s)~2~n -current-floor(s)\. 
This defines the next floor to be served as a nearest floor to the one where the 
elevator happens to be. 
The GOLOG procedures: 
proc seme( n) go_floor( n) ; turnoff(n) ; open; close endProc. 
proc go_floor( n) (current-floor = n)?lup( n)ldown( n) endProc. 
proc serve-a-floor (n n) [next_floor(n)?; serve (n)] endProc. 
proc control [while ( 3n) on( n) do serve-a_j7oor endWhile] ; park endProc. 
proc park if current_floor = 0 then open else down(O) ; open endIf endProc. 
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Initial situation: 
current-jloor( S,) = 4, on(b,S,) =b=3vb=5. 
Notice that this last axioms specifies 
moreover no other buttons are on. In 
initially about which call buttons are 
initial situation which will justify, in 
below in Section 5. 
Running the program: 
that, initially, buttons 3 and 5 are on, and 
other words, we have complete information 
on. It is this completeness property of the 
part, the Prolog implementation described 
This is a theorem proving task; we need to establish the following entailment: 
AxiomsK (3s)Do(controf,S,,s).4 
Here, Axioms are those of Section 2.5. Notice especially what this entailment says, 
and why it makes sense. 
l Although the expression DoCcontrol, S,, s) looks like an atomic formula, Do 
is a macro not a predicate, and the expression stands for a much longer 
second order situation calculus sentence. This will mention only the primitive 
actions up, down, tumofl, open, close and the fluents current_Jloor, on, 
next_Joor, as well as the distinguished situation calculus symbols do, S,, 
Pass. 
l Because this macro-expanded sentence is legitimate situation calculus, it 
makes sense to seek a proof of it from Axioms, which characterize the 
fluents and actions of this elevator world. 
A successful “execution” of the program, i.e., a successful proof, might return the 
following binding for s: 
s =do(open,do(down(O),do(close,do(open,do(tumoff(5), 
do(qQ),d ( 1 o cose,do(open,do(tumo~(3),do(down(3),S,)))))))))). 
Such a binding represents an execution trace of the GOLOG program for the given 
description of the initial situation. This trace, namely, the action sequence 
[down(3),tumofS(3),open,close,up(5),tumoff(5),open,close,down(O),open], 
would next be passed to the elevator’s execution module for controlling it in the 
physical world. 
As one can see from the example, GOLOG is a logic programming language in 
the following sense: 
1. Its interpreter is a general-purpose theorem prover. In its most general form, 
this must be a theorem prover for second order logic; in practice (see Section 
6 below, and Levesque, Lin, and Reiter [14]), first order logic is sufficient for 
most purposes. 
2. Like Prolog, GOLOG programs are executed for their side effects, namely, to 
obtain bindings for the existentially quantified variables of the theorem. 
4 Strictly speaking, we must prove the sentence (3s)Do(fI; control, S,, s) where n is the sequence of 
procedure declarations just given. The call to control in this sentence serves as the main program. See 
the definition of GOLOG programs and their semantics in Section 3.1 above. 
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:- op(950, xfy, [#I). /* Nondeterministic action choice.*/ 
do(U,S.S). /* This clause and the next are for Sequeuces l / 
do(CEiLl,S,Sl) :- do(E,S,S2), do(L.S2,Sl). 
do(?(P),S,S) :- holds(P,S). 
do(E1 # EZ,S,Sl) :- do(El,S,Sl) ; do(B2,S,Sl). 
do(if(P,El.E2),S,Sl) :- do([?(P),El] t C?(neg(P)),B2l,S,Sl). 
do(stex(E),S,Sl) :- do([] # CE.star(E)I,S,Sl). 
do(ahile(P,E),S,Sl):- do(Cstar(C?(P),El),?(ueg(P))l,S,Sl). 
do(pi(V,E),S.Sl) :- sub(V._,E,El), do(El,S,Sl). 
do(E,S,Sl) :- proc(E,El), do(El,S,Sl). 
do(E,S,do(E,S)) :- primitive_action(E), posa(B,S). 
/e snb(Name,New,Terml,Term2): Term2 is Term1 with Name replaced by New. l / 
sub(Xl,X2,Tl,T2) :- var(Tl), T2 = Tl. 
aub(Xl,X2,Tl,T2) :- not var(Tl), Tl = Xl, T2 = X2. 
aub(Xl,X2,Tl,T2) :- not Tl = Xl, Tl =..CPILl], sub_list(Xl,X2,Ll,L2), 
T2 =..[FIL2]. 
sub_list(Xl,X2,[1,[1). 
sub_list(Xl.X2,[TlILlI,CT2IL2]) :- sub(Xl.X2,Tl,T2), sub_list(Xl,X2,Ll,LZ). 
holds(aud(Pl,P2),S) :- holds(Pl,S), holds(P2,S). 
holds(or(Pl,P2),S) :- holds(Pl,S); holds(P2,S). 
holds(neg(P).S) :- not holds(P,S). /* Negation by failuxe */ 
holds(some(V,P),S) :- sub(V,_,P,Pl), holds(Pl,S). 
FIGURE 1. A GOLOG interpreter in CProlog. 
5. IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTATION 
In this section, we discuss an implementation of the GOLOG language in Prolog. 
We begin by presenting a very simple version of this interpreter. We then show 
how the elevator example above would be written for this interpreter and some 
execution traces. We conclude by listing some of the applications currently being 
investigated in GOLOG. 
5.1. An Interpreter 
Given that the execution of GOLOG involves a finding a proof in second-order 
logic, it is perhaps somewhat surprising how easy it is to write a GOLOG 
interpreter. Figure 1 shows the entire program in CProlog. 
The do predicate here takes 3 arguments: a GOLOG action expression, and 
terms standing for the initial and final situations. Normally, a query will be of the 
form do(e, SO, S), so that an answer will be a binding for the final situation S. In 
this implementation, a legal GOLOG action expression e is one of the following: 
l [e 1,. . . , e,], sequence. 
l ?(p), where p is a condition (see below). 
l e1 # e2, nondeterministic hoice of e, or e2. 
l if(p,el,e2), conditional. 
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l star(e), nondeterministic repetition. 
l while(p,e), iteration. 
l pi(u, e) nondeterministic assignment, where u is an atom (standing for a 
GOLOG variable) and e is a GOLOG action expression that uses u. 
l a, where a is the name of a user-declared primitive action or defined 
procedure (see below). 
A condition p in the above is either a fluent or an expression of the form 
and(p,,p,), or(p1,p2), neg(p), or some(u,p), where u is an atom and p is a 
condition using U. In evaluating these conditions, the interpreter uses negation as 
failure to handle neg, and consults the user-supplied holds predicate to deter- 
mine which fluents are true. 
In this implementation, a GOLOG application (like the elevator, below) is 
expected to have the following parts: 
1. A collection of clauses of the form primit ive_action(uct), declaring 
each primitive action. 
2. A collection of clauses of the form prochzme, body) declaring each defined 
procedure (which can be recursive). The body here can be legal GOLOG 
action expression. 
3. A collection of clauses which define the predicate poss(act, situation) for 
every primitive action and situation. Typically, this requires one clause per 
action, using a variable to range over all situations. 
4. A collection of clauses which define the predicate holds@ent, situation) for 
every fluent and situation. Normally, this is done in two parts: 
(a) 
(b) 
A collection of clauses defining holds@uent, SO), characterizing which 
fluents are true in the initial situation. The clauses need not be atomic, 
and can involve arbitrary Prolog computation for determining entailments 
of the initial database. We make the usual Prolog closed world assump- 
tion on this database. 
A collection of clauses defining ho 1 ds(@ent, do(uct, situation)) for every 
combination of fluent, primitive action, and situation. Typically, this is 
done with a single clause for each fluent, with variables for the actions 
and situations. This amounts to writing the successor state axiom for the 
fluent. 
While this interpreter might appear intuitively to be doing the right thing, at 
least in cases where the closed world assumption (CWA) is made, it turns out to be 
non-trivial to state precisely in what sense it is correct. On the one hand, we have 
the specification of Do as a formula in second order logic, and on the other, we 
have the above do predicate, characterized by a set of Horn clauses. The exact 
correspondence between the two depends on a number of factors, and we do not 
intend to discuss them here. For a formal statement and proof of correctness of 
this interpreter, the interested reader should consult the companion paper 1141. 
Given the simplicity of the characterization of the do predicate (in first-order 
Horn clauses), and the complexity of the formula that results from Do (in 
second-order logic), a reasonable question to ask is why we even bother with the 
latter. The answer is that the definition of do is too weak: it is sufficient for finding 
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a terminating situation (when it exists) given an initial one,5 but it cannot be used 
to show non-termination. Consider the program 6 = [a* ; (x #xl?]. For this pro- 
gram, we have that 7 Do(6, s, s’) is entailed for any s and s’; the do predicate, 
however, would simply run forever. 
On the other hand, the semantics of Prolog is often formulated in terms of 
minimal models which, in the case of simple logic programs like the above 
interpreter, have a number of desirable features. Could we not use these ideas 
instead of second-order quantification to characterize GOLOG program execu- 
tion? The answer is that we could, but only when the set of axioms characterizing 
the initial situation S, can be made part of a logic program. Our specification of 
Do, on the other hand, is fully general: it does exactly the right thing even when 
the axioms describing the initial situation contain disjunctions, existential quantifi- 
cations, and so on. The semantics of logic programs can perhaps be generalized to 
accommodate such axioms, but it is not clear that the resulting specification would 
be much simpler than ours. 
We emphasize that the above interpreter relies on the standard Prolog CWA 
that the initial database-the facts true in the initial situation &,--is complete. 
This was the case for the logical specification of the elevator example of Section 4. 
For many applications, this is a reasonable assumption. For many others this is 
unrealistic, for example in a robotics setting in which the environment is not 
completely known to the robot. In such cases, a more general GOLOG interpreter 
is necessary. Such an interpreter might still make use of Prolog’s backchaining 
mechanism to reduce queries about the current situation to queries about the 
initial situation. In other words, regression-based query evaluation (Waldinger [34], 
Pednault [21], Reiter [23]) can be implemented using Prolog. However, answering 
the regressed queries in the initial situation would require, in general, the full 
power of a first order theorem prover. 
5.2. The Elevator Example 
In Figure 2, we present clauses defining the previously discussed elevator example, 
and in Figure 3, we show some queries to the interpreter for this program. 
In the first query, we ask the interpreter to pick a floor and turn off its call 
button. The answers show that there are only two ways to do this: either turn off 
floor 3 or turn off floor 5. 
In the second query, we ask the interpreter to either turn off a call button or to 
go to a floor that satisfies the test next-floor. Since this predicate has been defined 
to hold only of those floors whose button is on, this gives us four choices: turn off 
floor 3 or 5, or go to floor 3 or 5. 
In the final query, we call the main elevator controller, control, to serve all 
floors and then park the elevator. There are only two ways of doing this: serve floor 
3 then 5 then park, or serve floor 5 then 3 then park. Note that we have not 
attempted to prune the backtracking to avoid duplicate answers. 
‘This needs to be hedged: the Prolog interpreter is sufficient only if we assume a breadth-first 
execution strategy. Otherwise, GOLOG programs like park in Section 3.1, which terminate according to 
Do. could cause do to run forever. 
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/* Primitive control actions */ 
primitive_action(turnoff(N)). /* Turn off call button 1. l /
primitive_action(open). /* Open the elevator door. */ 
primitive_action(close). /* Close the elevator door. l /
primitive_action(up(N)). /* Move the elevator up to floor Ii.+/ 
primitive_action(down(N)). /* Move the elevator doun to floor N.*/ 
/* Definitions of Complex Control Actions */ 
proc(go_floor(N). ?(current_floor(N)) # up(N) t down(N)). 
proc(eerve(N), Cgo_floor(N), turnoff(N). open, close]). 
proc(serve_a_floor. pi(n, E?(next_floor(n)), serve(n)I 
proc (park. if( current_floor(O), open, [down(O), open])). 
/* control is the main loop. So long as there is an active call button, 
it serves one floor. When all buttons are off, it parks the elevator. l /
proc(contro1, [uhile(some(n, on(n)), serve_a_floor), park]). 
/* Preconditions for Primitive Actions */ 
poss(np(N).S) :- holds(current_floor(M),S), M < N. 
poss(doun(N).S) :- holds(current_floor(M),S), ?! > N. 
poss(0pen.S). 
poss(close.S). 
poss(turnoff(N),S) :- holds(on(N),S). 
/* Successor state axioms for primitive fluents. */ 
holds(current_floor(M),do(E,S)) :- E = up(H) ; E = do~(W ; 
not E = up(N), not E = down(N), holds(current_floor(H).S). 
holds(on(M),do(E.S)) :- holds(on(M),S), not E = turnoff( 
/* Initial situation. Call buttons: 3 and 5. The elevator is at floor 4. e/ 
holds(on(3),sO). holds(on(5),sO). holda(current_floor(4),80). 
/* next-floor(N) determines which of the active call buttons should be served 
next. Here, we simply choose an arbitrary active call button. l / 
holds(next_floor(N),S) :- holds(on(N),S). 
FIGURE 2. The elevator controller. 
5.3. Experimentation 
The actual implementation of GOLOG we have been using at the University of 
Toronto is in Quintus Prolog and incorporates a number of additional features for 
debugging and for efficiency beyond those of the simple interpreter presented here. 
For example, one serious limitation of the style of interpreter presented here is 
the following: determining if some condition (like current_floor(O)) holds in a 
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?- do(pi(n,[?(on(n)) ,turnoff(n)l),sO,S)- 
S = do(turnoff (3) .sO) ; 
S = do(turnoff(5),50) ; 
?- do(pi(n, turnoff(n) t (C?(next_floor(n)) ,go_floor(n)l)) ,eO,S). 
s = do(turnoff(3),sO) ; 
S = do(tumoff (5) ,501 ; 
s = do(down(3),sO) ; 
S = do(up(5) ,eO) ; 
no 
?- do(contro1,sO.S). 
S = do(open,do(down(O),do(close,do(open,do(t~noff(5),do(up(5),do(cloee, 
do(open,do(turnoff(3),do(down(3),sO)))))))))) ; 
S = do(open,do(dovn(O) ,do(close,do(open,do(turnoff(3) ,do(dewn(3) ,do(cloee, 
do(open,do(turnoff(5),do(up(5),sO)))))))))) ; 
S = do(open,do(dovn(O),do(close,do(open,do(turnoff(5),do(up(5),do(close, 
do(open,do(turnoff(3),do(down(3),sO)))))))))) ; 
S = do(open.do(down(O) ,do(close,do(open,do(turnoff (3) ,do(dorm(3) ,do(cloees 
do(open,do(turnoff(S),do(up(5),sO)))))))))) ; 
no 
FIGURE 3. Running the elevator program. 
situation involves looking at what actions led to that situation, and unwinding these 
actions all the way back to the initial situation. This process is called regression in 
the AI planning literature. Doing this repeatedly with very long sequences of 
actions can take considerable time. Moreover, the Prolog terms representing 
situations that are far removed from the initial situation end up being gigantic. 
However, it is possible in many cases to progress the initial database to handle 
this (Lin and Reiter [16, 181). The idea is that the interpreter periodically “rolls the 
initial database forward” in response to the actions generated thus far during the 
evaluation of the program. This progressed database becomes the new initial 
database for the purposes of the continuing evaluation of the program. In this way, 
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the interpreter maintains a database of just the current value of all fluents, and the 
distance from the initial situation is no longer a problem. 
To evaluate our interpreter and the entire GOLOG framework, we have been 
experimenting with various types of applications. The most advanced involves a 
robotics application-mail delivery in an office environment [91. The high-level 
controller of the robot programmed in GOLOG is interfaced to an existing 
robotics package that supports path planning and local navigation. The system 
currently works in simulation mode; experiments with a real robot have begun in 
collaboration with the robotics group at the University of Bonn. 
Another application involves tools for home banking [27]. In this case, a number 
of software agents written in GOLOG handle various parts of the banking process 
(responding to buttons on an ATM terminal, managing the accounts at a bank, 
monitoring account levels for a user, etc.), communicating over TCP/IP. 
CONGOLOG, a version of the language supporting concurrency (including 
interrupts, priorities, and support for exogenous actions) is 
mented, and experiments with various applications (meeting 
elevator coordination) are under way. 
6. DISCUSSION 
also being imple- 
scheduling, multi- 
GOLOG is designed as a logic programming language for dynamic domains. As its 
full name (alGO in LOGic) implies, GOLOG attempts to blend ALGOL program- 
ming style into logic. It borrows from ALGOL many well-known, and well-studied 
programming constructs such as sequence, conditionals, recursive procedures and 
loops. 
However, unlike ALGOL and most other conventional programming languages, 
programs in GOLOG decompose into primitives that in most cases refer to actions 
in the external world (e.g., picking up an object or telling something to another 
agent), as opposed to commands which merely change machine states (e.g., assign- 
ments to registers). Furthermore, these primitives are formulated by axioms in 
first-order logic so their effects can be formally reasoned about. This feature of 
GOLOG supports the specification of dynamic systems at the right level of 
abstraction. 
More importantly, GOLOG programs are evaluated with a theorem prover. The 
user supplies precondition axioms, one per action, successor state axioms, one per 
fluent, a specification of the initial situation of the world, and a GOLOG program 
specifying the behavior of the agents in the system. Executing a program amounts 
to finding a ground situation term CT such that 
Rxioms k Do ( program, S, , u ) . 
This is done by trying to prove 
Axioms!= (3s)Do(progrum,S,,s), 
and if a (constructive) proof is obtained, such a ground term 
do( a, ) . . . qwqq&))...) 
is obtained as a binding for the variable s. Then the sequence of actions 
1ai,a*,..., a,] is sent to the primitive action execution module. This looks very 
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much like logic programming languages such as Prolog. However, unlike such 
general purpose logic programming languages, GOLOG is designed specifically for 
specifying agents’ behaviors and for modeling dynamic systems. In particular, in 
GOLOG, actions play a fundamental role. 
There is a body of literature related to the GOLOG project: 
Dixon’s Amala [3]. Amala is a programming language in a conventional 
imperative style. It is designed after the observation that the semantics of 
embedded programs should reflect the assumptions about the environment as 
directly as possible. This is similar to our concern that language primitives 
should be user-defined, at a high level of abstraction. However, while GOLOG 
requires these primitives be formally specified within the language, Amala 
does not. One consequence of this is that programs in GOLOG can be 
executed by a theorem power, but not those in Amala. 
Classical AI planning work (Green [6] and Fikes and Nilsson [4]). Like 
classical AI planning, GOLOG requires primitives and their effects to be 
formally specified. The major difference is that GOLOG focuses on high-level 
programming rather than plan synthesis at run-time. But sketchy plans are 
allowed; nondeterminism can be used to infer the missing details. In our 
elevator example, it was left to the GOLOG interpreter to find a legal 
sequence of actions to serve all active call buttons. But we can go well beyond 
this. As an extreme case, the program 
while 7 Goal do ( rr a) [ Approptiute( a)?; u] endWhile, 
repeatedly selects an appropriate action and performs it until some goal is 
achieved. Finding a legal sequence of actions in this case is simply a 
reformulation of the planning problem. 
Situated automata 1261. GOLOG shares with situated automata the same 
philosophy of designing agents using a high level language, and then compil- 
ing the high-level programs into low-level ones that can be immediately 
executed. In the framework considered here, the low-level programs are 
simply sequences of primitive actions. In [13], we also consider cases involving 
sensing (see below) where no such sequence exists, and it is necessary to 
compile to low-level programs containing loops and conditionals. 
Shoham’s AGENT-O programming language [31]. This includes a model of 
commitments and capabilities, and has simple communication acts built-in; 
its agents all have a generic rule-based architecture; there is also a global 
clock and all beliefs are about time-stamped propositions. However, there is 
no automatic maintenance of the agents beliefs based on a specification of 
primitive actions as in GOLOG and only a few types of complex actions are 
handled; there also seems to be less emphasis on having a complete formal 
specification of the system. 
A number of other groups are also developing formalisms for the specifi- 
cation of artificial agents. See [35] for a detailed survey of this research. 
Transaction logic (Banner and Kifer [2]). This is a new logic for defining 
complex database transactions, and like GOLOG provides a rich repertoire 
of operators for defining new transactions in terms of old. These include 
sequence, nondeterministic choice, conditionals and iteration. The Bonner- 
Kifer approach focuses on the definition of complex transactions in terms of 
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efementq updates. On the assumption that these elementary updates suc- 
cessfully address the frame problem, any complex update defined in terms of 
these elementary ones will inherit a correct solution to the frame problem. 
Unfortunately, Bonner and Kifer do not address the frame problem for these 
elementary updates; this task is left to the person specifying the database. 
6. The strategies of McCarthy and Hayes [20]. This is a surprisingly early 
proposal for representing complex actions (called strategies) in the situation 
calculus. McCarthy and Hayes even appeal to an Algol-like language for 
representing their strategies, and they include a mechanism for returning 
symbolic execution traces, as sequences of actions, of these strategies. More- 
over, they sketch a method for proving properties of strategies. While 
McCarthy and Hayes provide no formal development of their proposal, it 
nevertheless anticipates much of the spirit and technical content of our 
GOLOG project. 
The version of GOLOG presented here omits some important considerations. 
The following is a partial list: 
1. Sensing and knowledge. When modeling an autonomous agent, it is necessary 
to consider the agent’s perceptual actions, e.g., acts of seeing, hearing, etc. 
Unlike ordinary actions that affect the environment, perceptual actions affect 
an agent’s mental state, i.e., its state of knowledge. Scherl and Levesque [28] 
provide a situation calculus account of knowledge, and within this setting, 
show how to solve the frame problem for perceptual actions. 
2. Sensing and knowing how. In the presence of sensing actions, the method 
described above for executing a GOLOG program is no longer adequate. For 
example, suppose the sensing action SENSE, reads the truth value of P, and 
the primitives a and b are always possible. Then the following program 9 is 
perfectly reasonable: 
SENSE, ; if P then a else b endlf 
and should be executable with respect to any initial situation. However, it is 
not the case that 
for any ground situation term g. That is, at compile time, the agent does not 
know the truth value of P and therefore does not know the exact sequence of 
primitive actions that corresponds to the execution of this program. We have 
considered several possible solutions to this problem. See [ll, 131. 
3. Exogenous actions. We have assumed that all events of importance are under 
the agent’s control. That is why, in the elevator example, we did not include a 
primitive action turnon( meaning push call button n. Such an action can 
occur at any time, and is not under the elevator’s control. tumon(n) is an 
example of an exogenous action. Other such examples are actions under 
nature’s control-it starts to rain, a falling ball bounces on reaching the floor. 
In writing an elevator or robot controller, one would not include exogenous 
actions as part of the program, because the robot is in no position to cause 
such actions to happen. 
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4. Concurrency and reactivity. Once we allow for exogenous events, it becomes 
very useful to write programs which monitor certain conditions, and take 
appropriate actions when they become true. For example, in the middle of 
serving a floor, smoke might be detected by the elevator, in which case, 
normal operation should be suspended, and an alarm should be sounded until 
the alarm is reset. As mentioned earlier, we are investigating a concurrent 
version of GOLOG where a number of complex actions of this sort can be 
executed concurrently (at different priorities). We believe that this form of 
concurrency allows a much more natural specification of controllers that 
need to quickly react to their environment while following predetermined 
plans. 
5. Continuous processes. It is widely believed that, by virtue of its reliance on 
discrete situations, the situation calculus cannot represent continuous pro- 
cesses and their evolution in time, like an object falling under the influence 
of gravity. However, as shown by Pinto [22] and also by Ternovskaia [33], one 
can view a process as a fluent--falling(s)--which becomes true at the time t 
that the instantaneous action startfalling occurs, and becomes false at the 
time t of occurrence of the instantaneous action endfulling( One can 
then write axioms that describe the evolution in time of the falling object. 
Reiter [25] gives a situation calculus account of such natural events whose 
behaviors are described by known laws of physics. This means that one can 
write GOLOG simulators of such dynamical systems [8]. Moreover, although 
we have not yet explored this possibility, the GOLOG programmer can now 
write robot controllers which allow a robot to exploit such naturally occurring 
exogenous events in its environment. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
GOLOG is a logic programming language for implementing applications in dy- 
namic domains like robotics, process control, intelligent software agents, discrete 
event simulation, etc. Its basis is a formal theory of actions specified in an extended 
version of the situation calculus. 
GOLOG has a number of novel features, both as a programming language, and 
as an implementation tool for dynamic modeling. 
1. Formally, a GOLOG program is a macro which expands during the evalua- 
tion of the program to a (usually second order) sentence in the situation 
calculus. This sentence mentions only the primitive, user defined actions and 
fluents. The theorem proving task in the evaluation of the program is to 
prove this sentence relative to a background axiomatization consisting of the 
foundational axioms of the situation calculus, the action precondition axioms 
for the primitive actions, the successor state axioms for the fluents, and the 
axioms describing the initial situation. 
2. GOLOG programs are normally evaluated to obtain a binding for the exis- 
tentially quantified situation variable in the top-level call (3s)Do(progrum, 
S,, s). The binding so obtained by a successful proof is a symbolic trace of the 
program’s execution, and denotes that sequence of actions which is to be 
performed in the external world. At this point, the entire GOLOG computa- 
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tion has been performed off-line. To effect an actual change in the world, this 
program trace must be passed to an execution module which knows how to 
physically perform the sequence of primitive actions in the trace. 
Because a GOLOG program macro-expands to a situation calculus sentence, 
we can prove properties of this program (termination, correctness, etc.) 
directly within the situation calculus. 
Unlike conventional programming languages, whose primitive instruction set 
is fixed in advance (assignments to variables, pointer-changing, etc.), and 
whose primitive function and predicate set is also predefined (values and 
types of program variables, etc.), GOLOG primitive actions and fluents are 
user defined by action precondition and successor state axioms. In the 
simulation of dynamic systems, this facility allows the programmer to specify 
his primitives in accordance with the naturally occurring events in the world 
he is modeling. This, in turn, allows programs to be written at a very high 
level of abstraction, without concern for how the system’s primitive architec- 
ture is actually implemented. 
The GOLOG programmer can define complex action schemas-advice to a 
robot about how to achieve certain effects--without speciJLing in detail how to 
pegorrn these actions. It becomes the theorem prover’s responsibility to figure 
out one or more detailed executable sequences of primitive actions which will 
achieve the desired effects. 
while[ (3 block) ontabZe( block)] do ( T b) remoue( b) endWhile, 
is such an action schema; it does not specify any particular sequence in which 
the blocks are to be removed. Similarly, the elevator program does not specify 
in which order the floors are to be served. On this view of describing complex 
behaviors, the GOLOG programmer specifies a skeleton plan; the evaluator 
uses deduction, in the context of a specific initial world situation, to fill in the 
details. Thus GOLOG allows the programmer to strike a compromise be- 
tween the often computationally infeasible classical planning task, in which a 
plan must be deduced entirely from scratch, and detailed programming, in 
which every little step must be specified. 
There are several limitations to the version of GOLOG that has been presented 
here. The implementation only works with completely known initial situations. 
Adapting GOLOG to work with non-Prolog theories in the initial situation will 
require some effort (see [16] for ideas on this). Handling sensing actions requires 
the system’s knowledge state to be modeled explicitly [28] and complicates the 
representation and updating of the world model. Exogenous events also affect the 
picture as the system may no longer know what the actual history is. In many 
domains, it is also necessary to deal with sensor noise and “control error” (see 111 
for some initial results). 
We are also developing an extended version of the language called CON- 
GOLOG that supports concurrent processes, interrupts, and differing priorities on 
processes (based on an interleaving semantics for concurrent processes) [12]. 
Techniques for representing and reasoning about continuous processes (e.g., filling 
a bathtub) are also under investigation 1251. Finally, work is also in progress on a 
multi-agent distributed version of CONGOLOG for agent-oriented programming 
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applications, which will support distinct world models for each agent and a library 
of high-level communication actions [lo]. Notions like ability, goals, commitments, 
and rational choice become important in such domains and we are extending our 
model to deal with them [30]. _ 
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